Promotion Incentives, Career Decisions, and Police Performance|WIP Seminar with Taeho Kim

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Meeting ID: 843 3467 4987
Passcode: 862513

I examine how promotion incentives affect bureaucrats' performance and career decisions in the setting of the Chicago Police Department (CPD), where I observe changes in officers' behaviors when their expectations about promotion chances suddenly change in the middle of their career. In CPD, strict eligibility criteria in the promotion opportunities gave a discontinuous rise in promotion chances for eligible officers, expediting the eligible officers' first promotion opportunities by seven years relative to otherwise similar ineligible officers. I find surprising asymmetrical impacts: while the promotion opportunities did not improve eligible officers' performance or retention, the reduced promotion incentives actually encouraged ineligible officers to sharply raise arrest performance and join teams that tackled more serious crimes. These findings highlight that bureaucrats adapt their career orientations in response to changing career circumstances in a way that is very different from the private sector.